Abstract-A security measure called effective security is defined that includes strong secrecy and stealth communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] derived the secrecy capacity for degraded wiretap channels (see Fig. 1 ). Csiszár and Körner [2] extended the results to broadcast channels with confidential messages. In both [1] and [2] , secrecy was measured by a normalized mutual information between the message M and the eavesdropper's output Z n under a secrecy constraint
which is referred to as weak secrecy. Weak secrecy has the advantage that one can trade off S for rate. The drawback is that even S ≈ 0 is usually considered too weak because the eavesdropper can decipher nS bits of M , which grows with n. Therefore, [3] (see also [4] ) advocated using strong secrecy where secrecy is measured by the unnormalized mutual information I(M ; Z n ) and requires
for any ξ > 0 and sufficiently large n. In related work, Han and Verdú [5] studied resolvability based on variational distance that addresses the number of bits needed to mimic a marginal distribution of a prescribed joint distribution. Bloch and Laneman [6] used the resolvability approach of [5] and extended the results in [2] to continuous random variables and channels with memory.
The main contribution of this work is to define and justify the usefulness of a new and stronger security measure for wiretap channels that includes not only reliability and (wiretapper) confusion but also stealth. The measure is satisfied by random codes and by using a recently developed simplified proof [7] of resolvability based on unnormalized informational divergence (see also [8, Lemma 11] ). In particular, we measure secrecy by the informational divergence
where P MZ n is the joint distribution of M Z n , P M is the distribution of M , P Z n is the distribution of Z n , and Q Z n is the distribution that the eavesdropper expects to observe when the source is not communicating useful messages. We call this security measure effective secrecy.
One can easily check that (see (7) below)
where we interpret I(M ; Z n ) as a measure of "nonconfusion" and D(P Z n ||Q Z n ) as a measure of "non-stealth". We justify the former interpretation by using error probability in Sec. III and the latter by using binary hypothesis testing in Sec. IV. Thus, by making D(P MZ n ||P M Q Z n ) → 0 we not only keep the message secret from the eavesdropper but also hide the presence of meaningful communication.
We remark that the choice of default behavior Q Z n in (3) will depend on the application. For example, if the default behavior is to send a code word, then Q Z n = P Z n and one achieves stealth for "free". On the other hand, if the default behavior is of the type Q Z n = Q n Z , where Q n Z is a product distribution (see Sec. II below), then we must be more careful. We mostly focus on the case Q Z n = Q n Z . We also remark that one need not consider stealth as being combined with confusion as in (4), see Sec. III-C below. We combine these concepts mainly for convenience of the proofs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we state the problem. In Section III we state and prove the main result. Section IV relates the result to hypothesis testing. Section V discusses related works.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Random variables are written with upper case letters and their realizations with the corresponding lower case letters. Superscripts denote finite-length sequences of variables/symbols, e.g., X n = X 1 , . . . , X n . Subscripts denote the position of a variable/symbol in a sequence. For instance, X i denotes the i-th variable in X n . We use X n i to denote the sequence X i , . . . , X n , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A random variable X has probability distribution P X and the support of P X is denoted as supp(P X ). We write probabilities with subscripts P X (x) but we drop the subscripts if the arguments of the distribution are lower case versions of the random variables. For example, we write P (x) = P X (x). If the X i , i = 1, . . . , n, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to P X , then we have P (x n ) = n i=1 P X (x i ) and we write P X n = P n X . We often also use Q 
S is denoted as |S| and the complement is denoted as S c . For X with alphabet X , we denote P X (S) = x∈S P X (x) for any S ⊆ X . We use T n ǫ (P X ) to denote the set of lettertypical sequences of length n with respect to the probability distribution P X and the non-negative number ǫ [9, Ch. 3], [10] , i.e., we have
where N (a|x n ) is the number of occurrences of a in x n .
B. Wire-Tap Channel
Consider the wire-tap channel depicted in Fig. 1 . Joey has a message M which is destined for Chandler but should be kept secret from Ross. The message M is uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , L}, L = 2 nR , and an encoder f (·) maps M to the sequence
with help of a randomizer variable W that is independent of M and uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , L 1 }, L 1 = 2 nR1 . The purpose of W is to confuse Ross so that he learns little about M . X n is transmitted through a memoryless channel Q n Y Z|X . Chandler observes the channel output Y n while Ross observes Z n . The pair M Z n has the joint distribution P MZ n . Chandler estimatesM from Y n and the average error probability is
Ross tries to learn M from Z n and secrecy is measured by
Non-Stealth (7) where P Z n is the distribution Ross observes at his channel output and Q n Z is the default distribution Ross expects to observe if Joey is not sending useful information. For example, if Joey transmits X n with probability Q n X (X n ) through the channel, then we have
When Joey sends useful messages, then P Z n and Q n Z are different. But a small D(P MZ n ||P M Q n Z ) implies that both I(M ; Z n ) and D(P Z n ||Q n Z ) are small which in turn implies that Ross learns little about M and cannot recognize whether Joey is communicating anything meaningful. A rate R is achievable if for any ξ 1 , ξ 2 > 0 there is a sufficiently large n and an encoder and a decoder such that
The effective secrecy capacity C S is the supremum of the set of achievable R. We wish to determine C S .
III. MAIN RESULT AND PROOF
We prove the following result.
Theorem 1:
The effective secrecy capacity of the wire-tap channel is the same as the weak and strong secrecy capacity, namely
where the maximization is over all joint distributions Q V X satisfying the Markov chain
One may restrict the cardinality of V to |V| ≤ |X | .
A. Achievability
We use random coding and the proof technique of [7] .
and we denote the random codebook by
Encoding: To send a message m, Joey chooses w uniformly from {1, . . . , L 1 } and transmits x n (m, w). Hence, for a fixed codebook C = C every x n (m, w) occurs with probability
rather than Q n X (x n (m, w)) (see (8) ) and Q n Z may not be the same as P Z n . Further, for every pair (m, z n ) we have
)). (17)
Otherwise he puts out (m,ŵ) = (1, 1). Analysis: Define the events
Let E = E 1 ∪ E 2 so that we have
where we have used the union bound. Pr[E 1 ] can be made small with large n as long as
where δ ǫ (n) → 0 as n → ∞ (see [10] ) which implies that P
where δ ′ ǫ (n) → 0 as n → ∞. This is because the divergence averaged over M , W , C and Z n satisfies (see [7, Equ. (9) ])
where (a) follows from the chain rule for informational divergence; (b) follows from (16) and by taking the expectation over M, W, X n (1, 1) , . . . , X n (L, L 1 ), Z n ; (c) follows by the concavity of the logarithm and Jensen's inequality applied to the expectation over the X n (m, j), j = w for a fixed m; (d) follows by choosing X n Z n ∼ Q n XZ . Next we can show that the right hand side (RHS) of (23) is small if (22) is valid by splitting the expectation in (23) into sums of typical and atypical pairs (see [7, Equ. (11)-(16)]) . But if the RHS of (23) approaches 0, then using (7) we have
Combining (20), (21) and (22) we can make Pr[E] → 0 as n → ∞ as long as
We hence have the achievability of any R satisfying
Of course, if the RHS of (27) is non-positive, then we require R = 0. Now we prefix a channel Q 
Using a similar analysis as above, we have the achievability of any R satisfying
where the maximization is over all Q V X satisfying (12) . Again, if the RHS of (29) is non-positive, then we require R = 0. As usual, the purpose of adding the auxiliary variable V is to potentially increase R. Note that V = X recovers (27). Hence, the RHS of (27) is always smaller than or equal to the RHS of (29).
Remark 1:
The steps (23) imply that secrecy and stealth are attained for every message m and not just for the average over all messages. We were aware of this observation at the time of submission but did not explicitly point this out. However, one of the reviewers felt that this observation "appears to significantly enhance the practical value of the secrecy concept" and asked us to emphasize this.
Remark 2:
where (a) follows by the independence of M and the code words. Therefore, as E[D(P MZ n | C ||P M Q n Z )] → 0 we have I(M C; Z n ) → 0 which means that M C and Z n are (almost) independent. This makes sense, since for effective secrecy the adversary learns little about M and the presence of meaningful transmission.
B. Converse
The converse follows as in [2, Theorem 1] . An alternative and simpler proof can be derived using the telescoping identity [12, Sec. G] . Details can be found in [13] .
C. Choice of Security Measures
Effective secrecy includes both strong secrecy and stealth communication. One may argue that using only I(M ; Z n ) or D(P Z n ||Q n Z ) would suffice to measure secrecy. However, we consider two examples where secrecy is achieved but not stealth, and where stealth is achieved but not secrecy.
Example 1:
Suppose that Joey inadvertently uses Q X rather than Q X for codebook generation, where (22) is still satisfied. For example, Q X may represent no energy while Q X must have positive energy. The new Q X could result in a different expected Q n Z = Q n Z . Hence, as n grows large we have
where
Ross thus recognizes that Joey is transmitting useful information even though he cannot decode.
If Joey is not careful and chooses R 1 such that (22) is violated and (33) is satisfied, then D(P Z n ||Q n Z ) can be made small but we have
For example, Joey might choose R 1 = 0. Thus, although the communication makes D(P Z n ||Q n Z ) small, Ross can learn
bits about M if he is willing to pay a price and always tries to decode (see Sec. IV).
IV. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The reader may wonder how D(P Z n ||Q n Z ) relates to stealth. We consider a hypothesis testing framework and show that as long as (33) is satisfied, the best Ross can do to detect Joey's action is to guess.
For every channel output z n , Ross considers two hypotheses
If H 0 is accepted, then Ross decides that Joey's transmission is not meaningful, whereas if H 1 is accepted, then Ross decides that Joey is sending useful messages. We define two kinds of error probabilities
The value α is referred to as the level of significance [14] and corresponds to the probability of raising a false alarm, while β corresponds the probability of mis-detection. In practice, raising a false alarm can be expensive. Therefore, Ross would like to minimize β for a given tolerance level of α. To this end, Ross performs for every z n a ratio test
and makes a decision depending on a threshold F , F ≥ 0, namely
Define the set of z n for which H 0 is accepted as
and (A n F ) c is the set of z n for which H 1 is accepted (see Fig. 2 ). Ross chooses the threshold F and we have
The ratio test in (40) is the Neyman-Pearson test which is optimal [14, Theorem 3.2.1] in the sense that it minimizes β for a given α. We have the following lemma. 
which goes to 0 as ξ 2 → 0. where ||P X − Q X || TV = x∈X |P (x) − Q(x)| is the variational distance between P X and Q X and where the inequality follows by Pinsker's inequality [15, Theorem 11.6.1]. We further have
where (a) follows by the triangle inequality. Combining (46) and (47), we have the bounds (44). Fig. 3 illustrates the optimal tradeoff between α and β for stealth communication, i.e., when (33) is satisfied. As n → ∞ and ξ 2 → 0, we have
If Ross allows no false alarm (α = 0), then he always ends up with mis-detection (β = 1). If Ross tolerates no mis-detection (β = 0), he pays a high price (α = 1). Further, for any given α, the optimal mis-detection probability is
But Ross does not need to see Z n or perform an optimal test to achieve β opt . He may randomly choose some A ′ such that
and achieves β ′ opt = 1 − α. The best strategy is thus to guess. On the other hand, if
then Ross detects Joey's action and we can have
We thus operate in one of two regimes in Fig. 3 , either near (α, β) = (0, 0) or near the line α + β = 1.
V. DISCUSSION Our resolvability proof differs from that in [6] in that we rely on unnormalized informational divergence [7] instead of variational distance [5] . Our proof is simpler and the result is stronger than that in [6] when restricting attention to product distributions and memoryless channels because a small D(P MZ n ||P M Q n Z ) implies small I(M ; Z n ) and D(P Z n ||Q n Z ) while a small ||P X n − Q n X || TV implies only a small I(M ; Z n ) [4, Lemma 1].
Hayashi studied strong secrecy for wire-tap channels using resolvability based on unnormalized divergence and he derived bounds for nonasymptotic cases [11, Theorem 3] . We remark that Theorem 1 can be derived by extending [11, Lemma 2] to asymptotic cases. However, Hayashi did not consider stealth but focused on strong secrecy, although he too noticed a formal connection to (7) [11, p. 1568] .
